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Abstract. I n  I t aly, a s in  o t h er co un t ries aro un d t h e world, recent reforms share the goal of 
increasing the fiscal autonomy of lower tiers of governments, from Regions to Municipalities, in 
order to align spending with funding responsibilities and increase the efficiency in the provision 
of essential public services. The purpose of this paper is to assess spending efficiency of local 
governments and to investigate the effects of tax decentralization, focusing on the role played 
by incumbent politicians’ accountability. The analysis relies on a sample of Italian municipalities 
and exploits both parametric (SFA) and nonparametric (DEA) techniques to study spending 
inefficiency and its main determinants. Consistently with modern fiscal federalism theories, our 
results show that more fiscally autonomous municipalities exhibit less inefficient behaviours. 
We also find that the shorter is the distance from new elections, the higher is excess spending, 
thus giving further support to the traditional “electoral budget cycle” argument. Other political 
features of governing coalition, such as age and gender of the mayor, do not seem to exert any 
significant impact on inefficiency levels.  
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1. Introduction 
In Italy, as in other countries around the world, recent reforms (simply 
discussed or, at least partially, implemented) share the goal of increasing the 
fiscal autonomy of lower tiers of governments, from Regions to Municipalities. 
Increasing fiscal decentralization implies a better alignment between spending 
and  funding responsibilities and, as suggested by economists, a potential 
improvement of the efficiency (as well as of the effectiveness) of public services 
provided to citizens. The mechanism to explain these improvements in public 
spending efficiency and voter welfare suggested by modern theoretical 
literature on fiscal federalism highlights the importance of electoral 
accountability of incumbent politicians, obtainable by increasing the degree of 
fiscal autonomy (e.g., Hindriks and Lockwood, 2009; Weingast, 2009). 
Is fiscal decentralization really effective in reaching this end? The available 
empirical literature considered mostly the impact of fiscal decentralization on 
the size of spending, basically assuming that a large spending is inefficient (e.g., 
Fiva, 2006; Borge and Rattsø, 2008). Very few papers attempted at identifying 
efficient spending, by exploiting the literature on production and cost frontiers 
estimation (Coelli et al., 2005), thus, separating productive inefficiencies from 
total spending. Moreover, the few works on the determinants of efficiency in local 
governments has explored the role of several variables (socio-economic and 
political characteristics, geographic location, etc.), but in a very small number of 
cases these determinants could be related to fiscal federalism and the incentives 
it creates. Among all these variables, it is interesting to note the role of grants 
and taxes. In all the studies, it appears that a high level of dependency from 
Central government transfers worsens the efficiency scores. As for taxation, 
results are somewhat mixed. A positive relationship between higher local tax 
rates and efficiency scores emerges in De Borger et al. (1994), De Borger and 
Kerstens (1996), and Vanden Eeckaut et al. (1993). On the contrary, the recent 
study by Balaguer-Coll et al. (2007) points out a negative impact of higher per 
capita tax revenues on productive efficiency.  
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Following this line of research, the purpose of this paper is to assess the 
impact of fiscal decentralization on local spending efficiency, taking also into 
account the influence of some political features of governing coalitions. Relying 
on a sample of 262 Italian municipalities, we compute efficiency scores adopting 
two different reference technologies: one nonparametric frontier (estimated by 
Data Envelopment Analysis – DEA) and one parametric frontier (estimated by 
Stochastic Frontier Analysis – SFA). Following the scant empirical literature on 
productive efficiency of municipalities (e.g., De Borger and Kerstens, 1996; 
Prieto and Zofio, 2001; Balaguer-Coll et al., 2007; Giménez and Prior, 2007), we 
selected output indicators that are proxies for services provided by local 
governments in their most fundamental competencies, both for their budget 
and for their own citizens. Specifically, we proxy outputs with the number of 
inhabitants, the total length of municipal roads, the amounts of waste collected, 
and the sum of the number of pupils enrolled in nursery, primary and 
secondary schools and the number of people over age 75 (to capture the needs 
for education, elderly care and other social services). Inputs are represented by 
disaggregated current expenditures in general administration, road maintenance 
and local mobility, garbage collection and disposal, education, elderly care and 
other social services. This represents an improvement with respect to previous 
literature, that so far has relied on a crude measure of current expenditure 
considered as a whole.  
After estimating the level of spending efficiency for all municipalities with 
both methodologies, we then investigate the impact of several proxies for fiscal 
decentralization and political accountability in two different ways. In the DEA 
nonparametric approach we rely on a two-stage analysis based on a Tobit 
regression model, while in the SFA parametric one we include the explicative 
factors for inefficiency directly in the frontier model, following the approach 
proposed by Battese and Coelli (1995). To this end, we consider as a measure of 
fiscal decentralization the ratio of municipal taxes on current expenditure, 
which represents a measure of vertical imbalance and – in our view – the best  
  4
proxy for electoral accountability of local politicians. We also augment our 
empirical models by considering the potential incentives towards higher 
efficiency stemming from fiscal rules implemented by the Central government 
(the so-called Domestic Stability Pact), imposing a tighter budget constraint to 
largest municipalities. Finally, we test whether the behaviour of incumbent 
politicians closer to new elections, as well as the political orientation of local 
government, significantly impact on spending efficiency. Our results show that 
all variables accounting for tax decentralization and politicians’ accountability 
are almost always significant determinants of efficiency. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we 
briefly review the vast theoretical literature on fiscal federalism, focusing in 
particular on inefficiencies and the role played by tax decentralisation. In 
Section 3, after discussing institutional details on Italian municipalities, we 
present our data and the empirical methodology. Results about the effects of 
fiscal decentralisation and  other economic and political  factors  on  spending 
inefficiency are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 ends the paper. 
2. Two generations of fiscal federalism theories 
In this section, we briefly review the vast literature on fiscal federalism, by 
focusing in particular on the theoretical interpretation of tax decentralisation. 
Economic literature on fiscal federalism has always been embedded in public 
finance, and it shares with public finance the view of governments and their 
functioning. According to Oates (2005), First Generation Theory of fiscal 
federalism (FGT from now on) developed within a tradition of studies in public 
economics that looked at government agencies as “custodians of the public 
interest”, with the objective of maximising social welfare, because of 
benevolence of politicians, or some sort of social pressure from citizens in 
democratic societies. Starting from these premises, in presence of differentiated 
preferences at the local level for public goods (such as roads or waste 
management), it is not surprising the improvement in social welfare obtainable  
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by decentralising their provision, a result well-known in the literature as 
“decentralization theorem” (Oates, 1972). Local governments can adjust the 
provision of public goods to meet local demands, hence improving the social 
outcome obtained with a uniform provision defined at the central level. Notice 
that, in this framework, the only possible inefficiencies might arise from 
interjurisdictional spillovers in the provision of local public goods. And this 
explains well the normative suggestion of using matching grants as pigouvian 
subsidies to local governments, provided from the Central government in order 
to internalize external benefits from local policies. Following these arguments, 
then, the case for decentralisation was based on a sort of trade-off between two 
sources of “inefficiencies”: on the one hand, when the provision of local public 
goods is centralised, uniform provision is inefficient if local demands are 
differentiated; on the other hand, when the provision is decentralised, local 
governments might not take into account positive externalities for other 
jurisdictions. Hence, the crucial problem in FGT was the proper assignment of 
functions to different levels of government, and – in turn – the “tax-
assignment” problem (Oates, 2005). As for the first challenge, the suggestion 
was to assign local governments the provision of local services with 
geographically differentiated preferences. As for the second problem, the 
normative suggestion was to assign the property tax to local governments, 
because it can work as a benefit tax and can be used to provide mobile 
economic units (like households and firms) with an efficient (and differentiated) 
level of local services. 
The types of inefficiencies on which FGT concentrates are not, however, 
those that typically makes newspapers’ headlines, from mismanagement of 
public resources to real cases of corruption. To understand dissipation of public 
monies one needs to recognise: first, that politicians do not typically act to 
maximise social welfare, but their own interest; second, that their effort in 
pursuing public goals cannot be directly observed by voters; third, that political 
institutions affects the heterogeneity of politicians (Oates, 2005; Besley, 2006;  
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Weingast, 2009). These are arguments at the core of the Second Generation Theory 
of fiscal federalism (SGT from now on), which analyses a different trade-off 
with respect to the one crucial for FGT. In particular, the “centralisation versus 
decentralisation” issue is based now on the comparison between the higher 
degree of policies coordination under centralisation (which guarantees the 
internalisation of externalities) and the higher degree of accountability of local 
politicians under decentralisation. Hence, from a normative point of view, 
decentralisation should be pursued not only when there are differences in tastes 
for local services, but also as a tool to achieve a better control on politicians’ 
performance. 
Of course, decentralisation does not come without dangers. As 
Prud’Homme (1995) observes, one such danger is the exploitation of “fiscal 
commons”, i.e., the opportunistic behaviour of local communities that inflate 
spending and free-ride on the nation as a whole to cover additional unnecessary 
expenditure. The opportunistic behaviour originates from the expectations that 
somebody else will help in footing the bill, which makes fiscal indiscipline more 
likely. As the literature puts it, the budget constraint of local governments 
becomes soft (e.g., Kornai et al., 2003); the problem then is how to harden local 
budget constraints. Oates (2005) suggests two fundamental avenues: a reliable 
and effective local system of taxation, and a system of intergovernmental grants 
which is not subject to manipulation. While the second of these suggestions 
poses several problems, the property tax is thought to be the answer for making 
a reliable and effective system of local taxation. Differently from FGT, however, 
here the role of property tax relies on the incentives for local governments 
toward the provision of local public goods that maximises property values, and 
– in turn – revenues (Tiebout, 1956; Glaeser, 1996). As Weingast (2009) puts it, 
«subnational governments that raise a substantial portion of their own revenue 
tend to be more accountable to citizens, to provide market-enhancing public 
goods, and to be less corrupt».  
  7
The evidence on this incentive effect stemming from local property tax is 
quite limited, and seems to be restricted to Norway so far. Fiva and Rønning 
(2008) suggest that – conditional on resource use – the local property tax 
increase school quality, measured by students’ achievements in national 
standardised tests. Borge and Rattsø (2008) find that local governments with 
property tax have 20% lower sewage costs than local governments without 
property tax. These estimated impacts are surprising given the Norwegian 
institutional setting, where 90% of local governments’ revenues are from 
Central government grants and regulated income taxes, while the remaining 
10% comes from user charges and property taxes. Moreover, the evidence is 
only indirectly related to productive efficiency in the provision of local services. 
In the remainder of the paper we concentrate on the Italian case, where local 
taxes fund a substantial share of total expenditures, and we focus on efficiency in 
the provision of most of the services provided by Municipalities. 
3. Empirical strategy 
The aim of the paper is to test the “accountability effect” of local taxes, a central 
proposition of the SGT of fiscal federalism. To this end, differently from the 
previous literature, we identify the inefficient component of municipal spending 
for the provision of local public services, and test whether and how such 
inefficiency is affected by the degree of tax decentralisation and other political 
economy variables. We first present some institutional details and the data, and 
then describe the two methodologies used to estimate inefficient spending. 
3.1. Institutional features of Italian municipalities 
The Italian Public Administration structure is characterised by different layers 
of governments: Central State, Regions, Metropolitan Areas, Provinces, and 
Municipalities. The Republican Constitution – implemented in 1948 and 
amended in 2001 – assigns different tasks to these different local governments. 
In particular, excluding Metropolitan Areas (which are basically a selection of 
the biggest cities in different regions), Municipalities are in charge of a wide  
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array of services: from administrative services provided directly to citizens 
(including, for instance, the Registry office) to local police, from local mobility 
to waste management and social services (like childcare or care for the elderly). 
Funding for Municipalities also include a number of different sources of 
revenues, from own taxes and charges for specific services to grants received 
from Regional and Central governments. According to aggregate data at the 
national level, about 2/3 of expenditure is funded with autonomous revenues, 
while the remaining 1/3 is received as a transfer from upper-level 
governments.1 The most important autonomous source of tax revenues is 
represented by the Italian local property tax, the so-called Imposta Comunale 
sugli Immobili (ICI), which brings about almost 1/4 of total municipal revenues. 
It applies on both domestic and business properties, according to a set of rules 
defined at the national level. Local governments can however freely set both the 
tax rate, in a range between 0.4% and 0.7%, and – up to a certain degree – total 
or partial exemptions for specific types of property. Other two important local 
tax revenues are represented by a surcharge on the Personal Income Tax 
(Addizionale Comunale IRPEF) and the specific charges for waste collection and 
management (TARSU). As for the first, which represents more than 10% of total 
revenues at the national level, Municipalities can only modify – within a very 
limited extent – the tax rate. As for the second – which is slowly changing from 
a tax to a tariff for the service provided – it is computed relying on a vague 
proxy of waste production (i.e., the size of the dwelling), and Municipalities can 
freely decide both rates and exemptions; it represents almost 10% of total 
revenues for Municipalities at the national level. Distribution of the tax base is 
of course very different among municipalities, especially for the local property 
tax and the surcharge on the personal income tax. 
Differences among municipalities arise also in terms of administrative and 
political rules, according to the size of the town as measured by total population. 
                                                 
1 It is worth highlighting that the situation is very  much  differentiated  across  the  country: 
indeed, Northern municipalities are funded with about ¾ of autonomous revenues, while for 
Southern municipalities the corresponding figure is only around ¼ .  
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For instance, the size of the municipal council varies between 12 members (for 
municipalities below 3,000 inhabitants) to 50-60 members (for municipalities 
above 500,000 inhabitants). The remuneration of the mayor and of council 
members increases with population size too. The monthly gross wage of the 
mayor ranges between 1,291 euro to 7,798 euro; gross wage for council 
members is computed as a percentage of the mayor one: it is 15% for small 
municipalities, and increases up to 75% for the largest ones. Electoral rules are 
also different, with a threshold fixed at 15,000 inhabitants: below this limit there 
is a single round of voting; above this limit, the rule is for runoff plurality 
voting. Term limits for the mayor are however the same: no more than two 
consecutives mandates are at present allowed. A single threshold operates also 
for the possibility to create neighbourhood councils within the city. These are 
sub-levels of local governments with independent budgets and are allowed for 
municipalities with more than 30,000 inhabitants. Finally, as local governments’ 
budgets are consolidated in the Italian whole public budget and contribute to 
define the national deficit – which is relevant for the fiscal rules defined in the 
European Stability and Growth Pact 2, Italy has introduced a so-called Domestic 
Stability Pact (DSP) since 1999. The fiscal rules for municipalities and other sub-
national governments have  often  been  varied  by  Central  State, that  imposed 
restraints alternatively on expenditure growth or the size of the deficit. The 
scope of the law spans over all levels of Italian territorial administrative 
structure: Regions, Provinces and Municipalities. However, starting from 2001, 
municipalities with less than 5,000 inhabitants were excluded from the DSP.3 
Besides tax structure, political rules and fiscal restraints, a last important 
dimension along which the municipalities appear to be different concerns the 
management form for a locally provided service, namely waste collection and 
                                                 
2 The Stability and Growth Pact, first introduced in 1997 and successively revised in 2005, is an 
agreement among EMU member states aimed at mantaining and enforcing fiscal discipline in 
the EMU. For more details, see Brunila et al. (2001). 
3 For a discussion of strengths and weaknesses of Italian DSP fiscal rules, refer to Gastaldi and 
Giurato (2009). A critical analysis of the main European experiences is provided in Ambrosanio 
and Bordignon (2009).    
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disposal.4 The observed alternatives range from direct production within the 
municipality (i.e., the so-called in-house provision), to the resort to a specific 
firm (publicly or privately owned), up to the creation of a cooperative company 
aggregating two or more municipalities in the management of the service5. 
3.2. Data 
Our sample is composed by 262 municipalities, all belonging to the Province of 
Turin. The Province of Turin represents an interesting case study within the 
Italian landscape, since it is the province with the highest number of local 
governments (315), thus ensuring a great variability in the data. This variability 
is confirmed not only by looking at population size (included are Moncenisio, 
with 48 inhabitants, as well as Moncalieri, with 55,000 inhabitants, besides 
Turin, the capital of Piedmont Region, with over 900,000 residents), but also in 
terms of territorial morphology (more than 10% of municipalities is located over 
1,000 metres of altitude), the management of public services, and political and 
socio-economic characteristics. 
However, at least to some extent, this huge heterogeneity across Province 
units introduces potential biases in our study, especially for the presence of 
some municipalities that are subject to different political rules and produce the 
analysed services within different environmental contexts. Therefore, we have 
decided to exclude from the sample – besides Turin (because it is one of the 
Metropolitan Areas envisaged by the Constitution) – all the towns over 15,000 
inhabitants, as they are clearly not comparable along several dimensions with 
other smaller municipalities. In terms of spending, the share absorbed by the 
four sectors considered in our analysis represents less than 80% of total current 
                                                 
4 In principle, the differences among municipalities as for the management form would involve 
also education and social services, like those provided by retirement homes and day nurseries. 
However, differently from waste management, spending for education and social services 
included in the municipal budget only represent direct transfers to the citizens to subsidize the 
access to these services, while operating costs are ruled out. 
5 As for the environmental services, it is worth highlighting the importance of the national law 
D.Lgs. 05/02/1997 (the so-called called Decreto Ronchi), which assigns different competencies to 
Central State, Regions, Provinces and Municipalities in this field. In particular, it establishes the 
power of Municipalities to define the management form for waste collection and disposal.  
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expenditure for the largest municipalities (see the discussion below). As for the 
political rules, these big municipalities are subject to a runoff voting mechanism, 
which can exert a specific impact on political outcomes and policy choices (e.g., 
Osborne and Slivinsky, 1996; Bordignon and Tabellini, 2009). Moreover, we 
excluded the municipalities located over 900 meters of altitude, as they show 
remarkably higher levels of expenditures compared to other municipalities (on 
average, 1800 Euro against 560 Euro per capita); this feature can be due to the 
fact that their provision of services is strongly affected not only by the 
particular morphology of the territory, but probably also by heavy tourist 
inflows6. 
3.2.1. Input and output measures  
The data we use in the empirical investigation were provided by different 
public institutions and refer to the year 2005. The most relevant information 
comes from the Budgets of Italian municipalities published by the Ministry of 
the Interior (the so-called Certificati Consuntivi). Other important data, especially 
for output indicators, have been obtained from the statistical services of Regione 
Piemonte and Provincia di Torino. The selection of input and output variables is 
strongly influenced by the Italian institutional framework depicted above. More 
precisely, we have selected the indicators by looking at the most fundamental 
competencies, both for the municipal budget and for the citizens.  
[FIGURE 1 HERE] 
In Italy, municipal current expenditure is classified in 12 macro-functions. 
More than 90% of current expenditure in our sample is represented by five of 
these functions (see Figure 1): “General administration” (39%); “Environmental 
management” (22%); “Educational services” (13%); “Social services” (including 
child and elderly care) (9%); “Road maintenance and local mobility” (8%). 
Clearly, the share of each function on local current spending varies according  
                                                 
6 Dividing the municipalities according to their altitude, one can observe that just starting from 
900 meters they show levels of average current spending beyond 1000 Euro per capita.  
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to municipal size: for instance, moving from the smallest municipalities (0-500 
inhabitants) to the biggest ones (between 10,000 and 15,000 inhabitants), the 
weight of “General administration” decreases from 54% to 31%, while the 
shares of “Educational services” and “Social services” increase from 6% and 5% 
to 13% and 12%, respectively. We use current expenditure of municipalities in 
each of these items as an input indicator (EXP). For “General administration”, 
“Educational services”, “Road maintenance and local mobility”, we consider the 
whole expenditure as registered in the municipal budget. In order to strengthen 
the connection between spending and selected output indicator, for “Social 
services” and “Environmental management” categories, we just retain a fraction 
of total expenditure devoted to these functions. Spending for “Environmental 
management” only includes the sub-item “Garbage collection and disposal”, 
which represents a relevant share of the whole expenditure related to this task 
(60-70%). Similarly, from total spending in “Social services”, we disentangle the 
component specifically devoted to public welfare and elderly care. Our final 
input represents, on average, 86% of total current expenditure, with very little 
variations across demographical classes of municipalities.  Notice that this 
selection procedure represents a significant improvement with respect to 
previous literature on local governments’ efficiency, which has so far relied on a 
crude measure of current expenditure considered as a whole. 
Following the available literature,7 we then defined four output indicators 
directly linked with these spending categories: (1) the total served population as 
output for “General administration”; (2) the amounts of waste collected for 
“Garbage collection and disposal”; (3) the total length of municipal roads for 
“Road maintenance and local mobility”; (4) the number of people in needs of 
care (i.e., those under 14 years old – enrolled in nursery, primary and secondary 
schools – and those over 75 years old) for “Educational services” and “Social 
services”. Even if it does not exactly represent a direct output of municipal 
production, total population (POP) is usually assumed to proxy quite well for 
                                                 
7 See, among others, De Borger et al. (1994), De Borger and Kerstens (1996), Prieto and Zofio 
(2001), Balaguer-Coll et al. (2007), Giménez and Prior (2007).  
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all the various administrative tasks the municipalities are involved in (e.g., 
maintaining the register of births, marriages, and deaths; issuing certificates, 
etc.). The number of people under 14 years old and over 75 year old (DEPEND) 
represents a consistent fraction of the needy and it is strictly connected to the 
provision of educational and care services. The amounts of garbage collected 
(WASTE) is the direct result of the principal competence in environmental 
management. The total length of municipal roads (ROAD) is aimed at proxying 
especially the output of municipal competencies in managing existing road 
infrastructures – i.e., road maintenance, public lights, local public transport 
arrangements, etc. – rather than in building new roads (which belong to a 
capital expenditure category); this choice is in line with the input variable 
defined above (spending for “Road maintenance and local mobility”). Table 1 
shows the summary statistics for all output and input indicators used in the 
following empirical analysis. 
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
It is worth noticing that our sample does not show any variability in input 
prices at which the municipalities buy the productive factors used to perform 
the five functions. Indeed, there is no wage flexibility, as salary scales and 
allowances of municipal personnel are completely fixed. Moreover, since we are 
considering only the Province of Turin, all municipalities have access to the 
same capital market, and obtain most of their funds from the same specialized 
financial institutions at the same interest rate. Thus, the hypothesis of identical 
input prices across municipalities is quite plausible.8 Consequently, throughout 
the analysis we focus on the measurement of overall cost inefficiency or, better, 
spending inefficiency, as it is more closely related to the nature of our data than 
pure technical inefficiency.9 
                                                 
8 About this issue, see also the discussion in De Borger and Kerstens (1996). 
9 As for the decomposition of overall cost inefficiency into allocative and technical inefficiency, 
refer to Coelli et al. (2005, chapter 10).  
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3.3. Empirical models 
The techniques adopted to assess productive efficiency are usually classified in 
parametric and nonparametric methods. We estimate here both a nonparametric 
deterministic frontier (DEA model) and a parametric stochastic frontier (SFA 
model). Each methodology actually presents advantages and disadvantages, 
but the literature has not been able so far to establish when a technique is 
strictly superior to the other (Coelli et al., 2005).  
Generally, when considering parametric techniques, the functional form of 
best-practice frontier has to be defined a priori, while, relying on nonparametric 
techniques, no functional form needs to be pre-determined and only the basic 
microeconomic properties of production set are imposed as constraints to a 
linear programming problem. On the other hand, SFA technique models both 
inefficiencies and variables outside the control of decision makers that might 
impact on production performances, while standard deterministic frontiers like 
DEA are able to account only for inefficiency, ruling out the role of stochastic 
disturbances. Given these pros and cons, it is therefore important to check the 
robustness of our results, by using both approaches to investigate municipal 
spending efficiency and the role played by fiscal decentralisation. 
3.3.1. The DEA model 
The DEA approach to efficiency measurement, first proposed in Charnes et al. 
(1978) seminal work, assumes the existence of a convex production set. The 
corresponding frontier is then built using a linear programming technique, 
given specific assumptions on the returns to scale. 
Let us define: qi as the column vector of the outputs and xi as the column 
vector of the inputs for the i-th municipality; X as the (4×n) input matrix and Q 
as the (4×n) output matrix, with n the number of municipalities included in the 
sample. The DEA model is then specified as the solution to the mathematical 




θ,λ  θ 
s.t.    –qi + Qλ ≥ 0 
θxi – Xλ ≥ 0 
N1'λ = 1 
λ ≥ 0 
[1] 
In problem [1], θ is a scalar (that satisfies θ ≤ 1); more specifically, it is the score 
that assesses technical efficiency of unit (xi, qi). It measures the distance between a 
municipality and the efficient frontier, the latter being defined as the linear 
combination of best-practice observations; when θ < 1, the municipality lies 
inside the frontier (i.e., it is inefficient), while θ = 1 implies that the municipality 
belongs to the frontier (i.e., it is fully efficient). The vector λ is a (n×1) vector of 
constants to be estimated, representing the peers’ weights used to project an 
inefficient unit onto the efficient frontier; the peers are other municipalities that 
belongs to the best-practice frontier, and are therefore used as benchmarks for 
the inefficient units. N1 is a n-dimensional vector of ones: the restriction N1'λ = 
1 imposes the convexity of the frontier, accounting for Variable Returns to Scale 
(the so-called DEA-VRS model); dropping this restriction would amount to 
assume Constant Returns to Scale (the so-called DEA-CRS model). 
Once no price variability across the n observations is assumed, as we do, 
following De Borger and Kerstens (1996), the measure of spending efficiency can 
be obtained as follows: 
Min
λ,xi* (wi'xi*) 
s.t.    –qi + Qλ ≥ 0 
xi* – Xλ ≥ 0 
N1'λ = 1 
λ ≥ 0 
[2]  
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where  wi  is a vector of unitary input prices and xi* are the levels of inputs       
(here expenditure) – computed according to the DEA-VRS model [1] – that a 
municipality should employ to be technically efficient. 
In order to investigate the effects of fiscal decentralisation on municipal 
spending inefficiency within the DEA framework, we rely on a standard two-
stage analysis (Coelli et al., 2005). Thus, we take DEA-VRS inefficiency scores 
and regress them on a set Z of explicative variables (the so-called inefficiency 
determinants). We specify a second-stage Tobit regression, a censored model that 
allows  us to make  proper inference on the factors underlying the estimated 
inefficiency, considering that fully efficient municipalities show a value of 1, 
and no values above 1 can be observed.10  
3.3.2. The SFA model 
Within the SFA approach, originating from the pioneer contribution of Aigner 
et al. (1977), we focus here on the cost function representation of a given 
production technology for municipal services. For an arbitrary i-th observation, 
the cost function C(qi, wi; β) defines a lower bound for spending Ci necessary to 
provide output levels qi at given input prices wi. The vector β is the set of 
technological parameters to be estimated. Stochastic parametric frontiers are 
based on the specification of a composed error term, which allows to 
disentangle spending inefficiency from stochastic disturbances: a symmetric 
component (vi) captures the usual random noise, while a one-sided (positive) 
error term (ui) is introduced to measure cost inefficiency.  
When a Cobb-Douglas technology with no variability in input prices wi is 
assumed, the resulting SFA spending (or cost) model, expressed in logarithmic 
form, is: 
                                                 
10 Recent developments in DEA (Simar and Wilson, 2007) permit to estimate the efficiency levels 
conditionally to the influence of exogenous variables Z, without assuming different distributions 
for the scores in the two stages of the analysis (which represents the main shortcoming of the 
standard Tobit procedure). However, the implementation of this advanced methodology faces 
computation difficulties and it is not essential in our context, given the aim of understanding 
the impact of fiscal decentralization, for which we check robustness of our results by exploiting 
both DEA and SFA techniques to assess productive efficiency.   
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lnCi = β0 +∑
m
mi m q ln β +∑
k
ki kd δ + vi + ui 
with i = 1, …, n 
[3] 
where C represents municipal current spending in the selected functions (EXP) 
and qm are the corresponding output indicators (with m = 1, ..., 4). In order to 
control for potential scale effects, similarly to the DEA-VRS model, we also 
include in the SFA model three dummies, dk: two variables capturing the impact 
on spending of extreme population size classes – i.e., municipalities with less 
than 1000 (POP-1000) and with more than 10,000 inhabitants (POP-10,000) – and 
one variable capturing the impact of geographical altitude – i.e., municipalities 
located over 600 meters (ALT-600).11 
Several procedures are available to estimate the SFA model [3], depending 
on the statistical assumptions with regard to the cost inefficiency component ui. 
Here, we rely on the maximum likelihood (ML) technique proposed by Battese 
and Coelli (1995, BC95 from now on), and assume the one-sided inefficiency 
term to be distributed as a truncated-normal: ui ∼ N+(η’Z, σu2). This specification 
allows the mean of spending inefficiency to be influenced – trough the vector of 
coefficients η – by the same set of observable exogenous factors Z included in 
the second-stage Tobit model discussed above. As for the symmetric random 
noise component vi, it is assumed to be distributed as a standard N(0, σv2).  
                                                 
11 Thresholds were selected by looking at the distribution of per capita current spending of 
municipalities according to their population size and altitude. The municipalities under 1000 
and over 10,000 inhabitants represent the extreme sides of a ∪-shaped trend that shows per 
capita spending along different dimensional classes. Moreover, the municipalities located at an 
altitude over 600 meters typically exhibit per capita spending levels significantly higher than 
the average of the sample. Interestingly, the 600 meters limit is also considered by the Italian 
Law 991/1952 to define mountain municipalities.  
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4. Results 
4.1. Comparing SFA and DEA inefficiency scores 
Table 2 shows the estimates of SFA spending model [3] for our sample of 262 
municipalities, considering four different specifications (from MODEL 1 to MODEL 
4), according to the set of selected inefficiency determinants Z (see Section 4.2). 
[TABLE 2 HERE] 
First, SFA estimates highlight the prevalence of spending inefficiency with 
respect to random noise in determining global error term (ui + vi): γ – the share 
of residual variance due to deviations from best practice frontier, σu2/(σu2 + σv2) – 
ranges from 0.687 in MODEL 3 to 0.599 in the MODEL 4, therefore supporting the 
argument that a traditional average spending function with the term ui equal to 
zero does not adequately represent observed local governments’ performances. 
Population served (POP) and waste collected (WASTE) are particularly relevant 
in explaining current spending variability (βPOP ranges between 0.65 and 0.70, 
βWASTE between 0.16 and 0.20), while outputs ROAD and DEPEND play a minor 
role. Moreover, constant returns to scale seem to dominate municipal services 
provision, as the sum of estimated elasticities with respect to the four outputs is 
very close to 1 (it ranges between 0.94 and 0.96). Notice, however, that this 
result crucially depends on the fact that 83% of our municipalities do not belong 
to the two extreme size classes (i.e., under 500 and between 10,000 and 15,000 
inhabitants, respectively)12 and are located under 600 meters of altitude. The 
importance of population size and the altitude in defining cost frontier position 
is also remarked by the positive and significant coefficients for the dummies 
POP-1000,  POP-10,000 and ALT-600,  which point to the presence of some 
adverse scale impact on current spending for the smallest and the biggest 
municipalities, as well as for the mountainous (and tourist) ones. 
                                                 
12 Following the classification adopted by the Ministry of Interior, the municipalities have been 
divided into seven size classes: under 499 inhabitants (13% of observations), between 500 and 
999 (22%), between 1000 and 1999 (25%), between 2000 and 2999 (9%), between 3000 and 4999 
(15%), between 5000 and 9,999 (11%), and finally over 10,000 (4%).  
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[TABLE 3 HERE] 
Summary statistics for inefficiency scores obtained from our five different 
models, one DEA-VRS and four SFA (ordered from the poorest to the richest as 
for the number of included inefficiency determinants Z), are reported in Table 
3. A first elementary insight is provided by the dichotomous classification of the 
observations as either fully efficient or partially inefficient according to the DEA 
model: 22 municipalities – belonging especially to the biggest and smallest size 
classes (over 10,000 and under 500 inhabitants) – emerge as efficient units with 
a score equal to 1. Considering both methodologies and all models, the mean 
inefficiency is about 0.22 for DEA-VRS and between 0.26 and 0.28 for SFA. It 
means that municipalities, on average, could provide the same output levels 
with a 22%-28% current spending reduction. Inefficiency distributions appear 
concentrated around the mean both in DEA and SFA models, since they exhibit 
a median very close to the average value, and 90% of observations show values 
of spending inefficiency lower than 0.50. Not surprisingly, standard deviations 
are generally small, and tend to be higher for SFA estimates due to the presence 
of more extreme scores. 
[FIGURE 2 HERE] 
More importantly, the correlation between DEA and SFA inefficiencies is 
very high, both considering VRS and CRS specifications for DEA. As already 
discussed, the inclusion of the three dummies in the stochastic cost frontier help 
controlling for the impact of variable returns to scale on efficiency estimates, 
like in a DEA-VRS, even if these effects do not vanish completely. Indeed, as 
previously discussed, SFA models highlight almost constant returns to scale, 
similarly to a DEA-CRS specification. Such a result is probably driven by the 
prevalence in our sample of medium-sized municipalities, for which returns to 
scale appear to be actually constant looking at the difference between DEA-CRS 
and DEA-VRS (see Figure 2). Variable returns to scale characterise instead the 
municipalities under 1000 and over 10,000 inhabitants. The first ones show 
increasing returns to scale, perhaps because of the stronger influence of fixed  
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costs on current spending, especially with regard to waste management and 
general administration services. The second ones mainly exhibit decreasing 
returns to scale, probably as they produce a wider range of more complex 
services; this is particularly true for social welfare spending (10% of current 
expenditures).13 As for the definition of the proper scale for providing the 
essential services analysed in this study, the municipalities with a number of 
served inhabitants from 2000 to 5000 seem to correspond to the optimal size; 
this evidence emerges by looking at both the differences between DEA-CRS and 
DEA-VRS scores and SFA inefficiency estimates in Figure 2. 
As a final remark, spending inefficiency (net of scale inefficiency) seems to 
decrease with municipal size in DEA-VRS model. A possible interpretation of 
this result relies on the argument that public managers are probably subject to a 
more severe control from their citizens when the latter can ask for differentiated 
and more effective services. To explore this issue more in depth, we turn now 
our attention to the analysis of the determinants of estimated inefficiency. 
4.2. Fiscal autonomy and other inefficiency determinants 
We study the effects of tax decentralization and other possible explicative 
factors for estimated inefficiency by adopting the two different approaches 
discussed in Section 3.3. As for DEA, results are derived using a second-stage 
Tobit model. As for SFA, results are instead obtained by using the single-stage 
BC95 estimation procedure. Besides a measure of fiscal autonomy – the key 
issue of this study – the other variables included in both the Tobit and BC95 
specifications embrace a variety of economic, political and institutional factors. 
Descriptive statistics for all the potential determinants of spending inefficiency 
are shown in Table 4. 
[TABLE 4 HERE] 
                                                 
13 Notice also that the proxy variable DEPEND is probably unable to fully capture the outputs 
generated by the expenditure devoted to this category.  
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Tables 5 and 6 present the results for the determinants of spending 
inefficiency obtained using SFA and DEA-VRS scores, respectively. We 
estimated four different models within each frontier approach, by augmenting 
the basic specification (MODEL 1) with a richer set of explanatory variables (from 
MODEL 2 to MODEL 4). All the estimates are extremely similar in terms of both 
the statistical significance and the sign of coefficients, showing that our findings 
are quite robust to alternative model specifications. 
a) Fiscal autonomy, revenue level, and discipline rules. Similarly to other countries, 
Italian municipalities rely on three main different sources of revenues: local 
taxes, grants from upper-level governments, fees and charges. We define fiscal 
autonomy (FISCAUT) as the percentage of current expenditures in the selected 
functions covered by local taxes (i.e., ICI + Addizionale Comunale IRPEF + 
TARSU).14 It is important to remark that it is the first time that such an indicator 
of vertical imbalance is used as an explanatory variable for spending inefficiency. 
In both set of estimates, the coefficient for this index of fiscal decentralization 
appears to play an important role, giving support to the theoretical insight that 
a higher accountability of local politicians can be obtained by increasing their 
responsibilities in terms of funding (e.g., Weingast, 2009). In particular, the 
higher the share of current revenues derived from local taxes the more efficient 
is the municipality in spending. The positive impact of local taxes on municipal 
efficiency supports some previous findings in the literature (Vanden Eeckaut et 
al., 1993; De Borger et al., 1994; De Borger and Kerstens, 1996), while suggesting 
that the other sources of revenues – in particular, grants from upper-level 
governments – act in the opposite direction.  
[TABLES 5 AND 6 HERE] 
We introduce another fiscal variable in the analysis, the dummy HREV, 
which is equal to 1 for the municipalities with a per capita level of total current 
                                                 
14 On the use of this ratio as an indicator of fiscal decentralization, see Akai and Sakata (2002).  
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revenues over the median (i.e., 646 Euro per capita)15. The first three models 
using both SFA and DEA scores show a positive influence of this variable on 
spending inefficiency. However, before interpreting this result in the light of the 
literature on soft budget constraint and fiscal bailout problems in decentralized 
settings (e.g., McLure, 1967; Prud’Homme, 1995; Inman, 2003), it is important to 
comment on the results obtained with MODEL 4. In this specification, per capita 
current revenues have been decomposed into their three principal sources: own 
taxes, fees and charges, and grants; like for total revenues, for each source we 
identified the municipalities characterised by a per capita level exceeding the 
median (HTAX, HEXTRA, HGRANT = 1, respectively).16 Contrary to most of the 
previous literature, our findings show that the significant and positive effect of 
higher current revenues on inefficiency is not due to a stronger incidence of 
grants, but to the role of taxes, as well as of fees and charges. This confirms the 
evidence emerged in Balaguer-Coll et al. (2007): a local government that is highly 
capable of generating own revenues would be less motivated to manage them 
efficiently. The result for HTAX and HEXTRA is justified in the light of the 
structure of our sample, in which the average weight of the central and regional 
transfers on the local current revenues is very low (16%) with respect to the 
national mean (25%)17. Overall, these findings – linked to the previous one  on 
the impact of tax decentralization – highlight that, while more autonomous 
municipalities tend to exhibit less inefficient spending behaviours, an excessively 
large availability of resources (in particular, from taxes and fees and charges) 
seems to exert a negative influence on spending efficiency, since it contributes 
to ease the budget constraint for local politicians. 
The importance of budget constraint faced by the municipalities is further 
investigated directly trough the dummy variable PACT, that distinguishes local 
governments subject to the DSP (see Section 3.1) from the municipalities with 
                                                 
15 We use this kind of indicator because the distribution of per capita current revenues exhibit a 
particular variability: the values under the median are rather close (between 477 and 646 Euro 
per capita), while over the median they jump from 646 to 1739 Euro per capita. 
16 See previous footnote.  
17 Data are taken from IRES Piemonte, Osservatorio sulla Finanza Locale del Piemonte, and Ministry 
of Interior, Dati sui Certificati di Bilancio dei Comuni.   
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less than 5,000 inhabitants, which, starting from 1999, have been excluded from 
this discipline rule. From our analysis, the presence of the DSP has a significant 
and reducing effect on spending inefficiency, even if only for DEA-VRS models 
(Table 6), probably because this factor partly captures a size effect in SFA 
models. Thus, the imposition of a tighter budget constraint seems to increase 
the accountability of incumbent politicians and improve spending efficiency. 
b) Political variables. We now focus on some political features of municipalities. 
The variable YGOV assumes 5 different values (from 0 to 4) and represents the 
number of post-election years for the mayor and the governing coalition. Both 
DEA-VRS and SFA estimates in MODEL 1, 2 and 4 show that electoral mandate 
has a significant and positive influence on spending inefficiency. This finding is 
in line with the empirical literature on the opportunistic behaviour of local 
governments linked to the “electoral budget cycle” argument (e.g., Galli and 
Rossi, 2002; Veiga and Veiga, 2007): in an effort to signal their competence to   
the voters, so as to increase their chances to be re-elected, incumbent politicians 
tend to enlarge spending when they are closer to new elections, i.e., when the 
number of post-elections years increases. Our result provides fresh evidence in 
support of this “electoral budget cycle” effect, by clarifying that the observed 
increase in municipal spending can be interpreted as a higher waste with respect 
to an efficient expenditure level.18 
                                                 
18 A control for the robustness of this result is provided introducing the dummy 2GOV, which 
distinguishes the municipalities with a mayor facing a second term limit from those with a 
mayor that can be re-elected. The theoretical literature suggests that the impossibility to be re-
elected influences the opportunistic behaviour of the incumbents, especially in proximity of the 
new elections (e.g., Besley and Case 1995, 2003; Smart and Sturm, 2006).  However, testing the 
effect of this variable – considered alone or interacted with the years of mandate – we did not 
observe any significant impact on the inefficiencies. A plausible explanation for this evidence 
could be found analyzing more in depth municipalities included in our sample: the dummy 
2GOV is equal to one for 26.5% of these municipalities. Among these, in the following elections 
(between 2006 and 2009), a person belonging to the previous governing coalition was elected as 
mayor in the 58% of the cases; in another 22% of cases, a person belonging to the previous 
governing coalition has been presented as one of the main candidates to become mayor. These 
statistics stress the role of a party affiliation and party discipline in identifying candidates and 
their behaviors once elected. Therefore, incumbents’ interests, merging in the party’s ones, do 
not vanish simply with their impossibility of re-election.  
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In MODEL 3, we test another landmark of the literature on the opportunistic 
behaviour of incumbent politicians linked to their desire to be re-elected, by 
interacting YGOV with the variable PACT: we find that YGOV*PACT impacts 
on spending inefficiency in a positive and significant way, while the pure effect 
associated to the number of post-election years loses its statistical significance. 
As found in the recent contributions by Mink and De Haan (2005) and Bartolini 
and Santolini (2009), there is then evidence of a stronger “electoral budget 
cycle” effect for municipalities subject to a fiscal discipline rule: while spending 
inefficiency increases in proximity of the election year, and the DSP seems quite 
effective in hardening local administrations’ budget (see the above discussion), 
the introduction of such a discipline rule tends to strengthen remarkably the 
opportunistic behaviour for those incumbents that are closer to the end of their 
electoral mandate; this could be due to a forward-looking behaviour, which 
leads to magnify DSP compliance in the early years of government, so as to 
exploit higher margins for increasing spending in proximity of new elections. 
We finally include the triple interaction YGOV*PACT*FISCAUT, to study how 
fiscal discipline rules and fiscal autonomy jointly influence the “electoral 
budget cycle”. One can notice that a higher degree of fiscal autonomy has the 
effect of dampening the “electoral budget cycle” impact on spending 
inefficiency observed for the municipalities under the DSP, hence increasing the 
importance of the argument of a higher accountability obtainable trough tax 
decentralization. 
We also control for the political orientation of governing coalition, using 
two dummy variables that assume value 1 if coalition parties belong to a centre-
left list (LEFT) or to a so-called civic list with no clear ideological orientation 
(CIVIC). As for LEFT, it emerges a significant and reducing impact on spending 
inefficiency in several specifications (BC95 MODEL 1, 2, 4 and Tobit MODEL 1, 2), 
while the coefficient for CIVIC appears significant only in BC95 MODEL 4. These 
results, however, are probably influenced by a net prevalence in the sample of 
municipalities led by civic lists (172 observations), all concentrated in small- 
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sized local governments. Notice also that the positive effect of centre-left leading 
coalitions on spending efficiency can be added to the existing political economy 
literature, which often found a propensity of the governments towards a larger 
expenditure associated to this political orientation (e.g., Blais et al., 1993; De 
Haan and Sturm, 1994). According to our evidence, the presence of a larger 
spending does not necessarily mean a higher inefficiency. 
Starting from MODEL 2, we have finally included two variables pertaining 
to mayor’s age (MAYORAGE) and gender (MAYORSEX). Both variables do not 
appear to affect significantly inefficiency levels. Again, this result adds to recent 
literature on the size and the composition of public expenditure, which stresses 
the key role of female representatives in determining policy preferences and 
spending outcomes (e.g., Edlund and Pande, 2002; Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 
2004; Funk and Gathmann, 2008). 
c) Management models for services provision. We finally introduce three dummies 
for capturing the different management models of waste collection and disposal 
that are observed in our sample. This particular service is provided by different 
municipalities using several governance forms. The importance that the service 
has recently gained in Italy for judging the behaviour of local politicians can be 
considered in the light of yardstick competition between municipalities, and 
stresses the meaning of efficiency in spending for the local administrations.19 
Waste collection can be managed: directly by the local government; directly by 
a consortium of local governments with the possibility for a municipality to be 
either consortium head or a simple participant; through a specialized external 
firm, which can be either publicly or privately owned; through a public-owned 
cooperative firm involving more than one municipality.  
We summarize these six different governance schemes in three variables. 
A first dummy (PUBLIC) distinguishes the public ownership from the private 
one; a second dummy (PUBLIC*FIRM) indicates that the service is provided by 
                                                 
19 Examples of the importance of waste management for evaluating local administrators include 
the recent garbage crisis and the subsequent scandals in Naples and Palermo. See, e.g., “Naples 
burns as residents protest at garbage crisis”, The Guardian, May 27th, 2007.   
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an external firm, conditionally on this firm having public ownership; finally, a 
third dummy (PUBLIC*FIRM*COOP) represents a cooperative firm, conditionally 
on being a publicly owned firm. The results we obtain – both for BC95 and 
Tobit models – highlight a significant effect only for the latter dummy, 
PUBLIC*FIRM*COOP: they show that it is neither important that the ownership 
of this local service is public or private, nor that the provision is through a 
company or directly from the municipality. It is, instead, relevant that, besides 
being public and run through a firm, garbage collection and disposal is 
managed cooperatively. The scheme of a public-owned cooperative firm would 
then  represent a more efficient  solution, probably because it associates the 
advantage of sharing huge fixed costs (typical of the consortium option) to the 
benefit of increasing expenditure control (typical of the external firm option).  
5. Conclusions 
This paper assesses spending efficiency of local governments, investigating, in 
particular, the role played by tax decentralization, as measured by the degree of 
fiscal autonomy in covering the costs associated to the provision of essential 
public services. The analysis relies on a sample of 262 Italian municipalities 
belonging to the Province of Turin, and exploits both nonparametric (DEA) and 
parametric (SFA) frontier techniques to study efficiency performances and their 
main determinants. 
Consistently with modern fiscal federalism theories, our results show that 
more autonomous municipalities – i.e., local governments with a higher share 
of current spending covered by own taxes – exhibit less inefficient behaviours. 
The strictness of budget constraint due to some fiscal discipline rules (here the 
Domestic Stability Pact) appears to be another important driver of spending 
efficiency. Moreover, the presence of opportunistic behaviours by the incumbent 
politicians  highlighted  by the theoretical literature on the  “electoral  budget 
cycle”  finds new empirical support. Finally, as for the political features of 
government coalition, both age and gender of the mayor do not seem to exert  
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any significant impact on the inefficiency level, while the political ideology 
belonging to left-wing coalitions is mainly associated with a lower excess 
spending.  
From a policy perspective, the evidence emerged in this study support the 
recent waves of reforms towards tax decentralization, observed all around the 
world, with the aim of increasing the fiscal autonomy of local governments, in 
order to improve both the efficiency and the effectiveness of public services 
provided to the citizens.  
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  Table 1. Summary statistics for output and input indicators of DEA and SFA spending models  
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION  NAME  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min         Max 
OUTPUTS (q)          
Population (nr. of served inhabitants)   POP  2657 2826  102  13,835 
Amounts of waste collected (quintals)              WASTE  12,117 13,914  486 76,107 
Total length of municipal roads (km)               ROAD  33 28  3  240 
Total number of pupils and old people 
(pupils enrolled in nursery, primary and 
secondary school + over 75 inhabitants) 
DEPEND  466 488  16  2449 
INPUTS (x)         
Current expenditure (103 Euro) 
a)  general administration  
b)  garbage management  
c)  road maintenance and local mobility  
d)  education and elderly care 
EXP  1297     1284  95  6743 
CONTROL VARIABLES (d)         
Dummy for less than 1000 inhabitants  POP-1000  0.35 0.48 0  1 
Dummy for more than 10,000 inhabitants  POP-10,000  0.04 0.19 0  1 
Dummy for altitude over 600 meters   OVER-600  0.17 0.37 0  1 
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Table 2. Estimates of SFA spending model [3]          
a Dependent variable: lnEXP.  






Table 3. Summary statistics for DEA and SFA inefficiency scores 
Regressor a   MODEL 1   MODEL 2   MODEL 3   MODEL 4 
ln POP        0.667***       
(0.047) 
      0.653***       
(0.048) 
      0.647***       
(0.047) 
      0.697***       
(0.044) 
ln WASTE        0.195***       
(0.030) 
      0.199***       
(0.029) 
      0.203***       
(0.029) 
      0.160***       
(0.029) 
ln ROAD    0.039*          
(0.011) 
  0.041*          
(0.013) 
    0.036**         
(0.011) 
    0.033**         
(0.010) 
ln DEPEND    0.055* 
(0.032) 




    0.059** 
         (0.029) 
POP-1000    0.049*          
(0.026) 
  0.043*          
(0.026) 
  0.046*          
(0.026) 
      0.075***       
(0.023) 
POP-10,000      0.081**         
(0.040) 
    0.090**         
(0.042) 
    0.097**         
(0.041) 
      0.108***       
(0.037) 
ALT-600      0.052**         
(0.022) 
    0.055**         
(0.022) 
    0.054**         
(0.021) 
    0.038**         
(0.019) 
σ2 = (σu2 + σv2)        0.013***      
(0.001) 
      0.013***      
(0.001) 
      0.013***      
(0.001) 
      0.010***      
(0.001) 
γ = [σu2/(σu2 + σv2)]            0.686*** 
(0.234) 
     0.680*** 
(0.259) 
      0.687*** 
(0.228) 
      0.599*** 
(0.187) 
Nr. observations 
Wald test [p-value]  
             262 
6725.54 [0.000] 
             262 
6762.53 [0.000] 
              262 
6794.52 [0.000] 
              262   
8631.28 [0.000] 








Mean  0.22 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.26 
Standard  deviation  0.12 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 
Median  0.22 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.25 
Max  0.52 0.90 0.88 0.87 0.97 
Min  0.00 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02 
Fully efficient municipalities  22  -            - - -  
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics for the determinants of spending inefficiency  
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION  NAME  Mean   Median  Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max  % 
FISCAL INDICATORS             
Fiscal autonomy  
(% local taxes on current spending in 
general administration, garbage 
management, road maintenance and local 
mobility, education and elderly care ) 
FISCAUT  62 85  17  34  120  - 
Total current revenues per capita    702 646  198  452  1739  - 
High revenues 
(Municipalities with a level of total current 
revenues per capita over the median) 
HREV  - -  -  - -  50% 
Tax revenues per capita    440 437  102  190 895  
High taxes 
(Municipalities with a level of tax revenues 
per capita over the median) 
HTAX  - -  -  - -  50% 
Fees and charges per capita    146 116  109 31 904  
High extra-taxes 
(Municipalities with a level of fees and 
charges per capita over the median) 
HEXTRA  - -  -  - -  50% 
Grants per capita    117 85  105 9 662   
High grants 
(Municipalities with a level of grants per 
capita over the median) 
HGRANT  - -  -  - -  50% 
Domestic Stability Pact 
(Municipalities subject to the DPS) 
PACT  - -  -  - -  15% 
POLITICAL INDICATORS                                            
        
Electoral mandate 
(number of  post-election years for the 
governing coalition in 2005) 
YGOV  1.40 1  1.03  0  4 - 
Electoral mandate*DSP                  
(interaction of the number of  post-election 
years for the governing coalition with the 
presence of DSP) 
YGOV*PACT  0.29 0  0.86  0  4 - 
Electoral mandate*DSP*Fiscal autonomy  
(interaction of the number of  post-election 
years for the governing coalition with the 
presence of DSP and the % of local taxes on 
current spending) 
YGOV*PACT*FISCAUT  1.35 0  3.98  0 19  -  
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics for the determinants of spending inefficiency (continued) 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION  NAME  Mean    Median  Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max  % 
POLITICAL INDICATORS                                      
Mayor’s gender                       
(Municipalities with a male mayor) 
MAYORSEX  - -  -  - -  83% 
Mayor’s age  MAYORAGE  52 54  10  28 79  - 
Civil list governing coalition  CIVIC  - -  -  - -  56% 
Centre-left governing coalition   LEFT  - -  -  - -  23% 
GARBAGE MANAGEMENT MODELS              
Public management  PUBLIC  - -  -  - -  77% 
Public management by a firm  PUBLIC*FIRM  - -  -  - -     32% 
Public management by a cooperative firm   PUBLIC*FIRM*COOP      -  -  -  -  -  27% 
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FISCAUT      -0.195***     
(0.041) 
    -0.186***        
(0.041) 
    -0.167***        
(0.040) 
    -0.466***        
(0.051) 
HREV 
     0.176*** 
(0.023) 
     0.175***  
(0.022) 




0.001            
(0.036) 
-0.008            
(0.035) 
-0.014            
(0.051) 
0.027             
(0.045) 
YGOV 
  0.016*          
(0.010) 
    0.019**         
(0.008) 
0.015             
(0.009) 
  0.014*           
(0.008) 
CIVIC 
-0.014            
(0.022) 
-0.014            
(0.022) 
-0.013            
(0.021) 
 -0.035*           
(0.020) 
LEFT 
 -0.047*          
(0.026) 
 -0.048*           
(0.025) 
-0.040            
(0.025) 
   -0.049**         
(0.023) 
PUBLIC 
-0.011            
(0.016) 
-0.026            
(0.020) 
-0.024            
(0.020) 
-0.019            
(0.018) 
PUBLIC*FIRM 
0.013             
(0.037) 
 0.012            
(0.036) 
0.010             
(0.036) 
0.032             
(0.031) 
PUBLIC*FIRM*COOP 
  -0.086**         
(0.053) 
  -0.088**         
(0.039) 
   -0.092**         
(0.038) 
   -0.068**         
(0.033) 
MAYORSEX  - -0.023             
(0.022) 
-0.022             
(0.022) 
-0.008             
(0.019) 
MAYORAGE  - -0.046             
(0.040) 
-0.049             
(0.040) 
-0.010             
(0.036) 
YGOV*PACT  -  -      1.517***        
(0.556) 
 0.729             
(0.476) 
YGOV*PACT* FISCAUT  -  -      -0.329***     
(0.122) 
-0.163             
(0.105) 
HTAX  -  -  -        0.227***    
(0.025) 
HEXTRA  -  -  -       0.063***     
(0.016) 
HGRANT  - - -  -0.012             
(0.022) 
Nr. observations             262  262  262  262 
Log-likelihood 212.4  212.9  217.1  250.0 
LR test [p-value]  115.6 [0.000]  118.7 [0.000]  133.8 [0.000]  199.7 [0.000] 


















FISCAUT      -0.072***     
(0.027) 
  -0.068**          
(0.027) 
  -0.053**          
(0.027) 
    -0.218***         
(0.033) 
HREV 
     0.098***  
(0.013) 
    0.100***       
(0.013) 




    -0.083***         
(0.021) 
    -0.082***         
(0.021) 
    -0.095***         
(0.033) 
  -0.070**          
(0.032) 
YGOV 
0.012*           
(0.006) 
   0.014**          
(0.007) 
-0.010             
(0.007) 
 0.009*            
(0.007) 
CIVIC 
-0.013             
(0.017) 
-0.013             
(0.017) 
-0.012             
(0.016) 
-0.016             
(0.016) 
LEFT 
 -0.032*          
(0.019) 
-0.033*            
(0.019) 
-0.028             
(0.019) 
-0.026             
(0.018) 
PUBLIC 
-0.014             
(0.016) 
-0.011             
(0.016) 
-0.008             
(0.016) 
-0.002             
(0.015) 
PUBLIC*FIRM 
0.002             
(0.029) 
0.003              
(0.029) 
-0.005             
(0.028) 
0.008              
(0.026) 
PUBLIC*FIRM*COOP 
 -0.050*            
(0.030) 
-0.050*            
(0.030) 
 -0.052*        
(0.029) 
  -0.041**          
(0.017) 
MAYORSEX  - 0.001              
(0.017) 
-0.001              
(0.017) 
-0.009              
(0.016) 
MAYORAGE  - -0.038              
(0.031) 
-0.049              
(0.040) 
-0.027              
(0.028) 
YGOV*PACT  -  -       1.531***        
(0.415) 
     1.103***        
(0.391) 
YGOV*PACT* FISCAUT  -  -      -0.333***      
(0.091) 
    -0.242***       
(0.086) 
HTAX  -  -  -       0.117***        
(0.014) 
HEXTRA  -  -  -       0.043***       
(0.013) 
HGRANT  - -  -  -0.016              
(0.016) 
Nr. observations             262  262  262  262 
Log-likelihood 186.5  187.0  193.1  207.0 
LR test [p-value]  121.7 [0.000]  122.1 [0.000]  136.4 [0.000]  164.2 [0.000] 
*, **, ***: statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% respectively.    
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